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Abstract
Most of the international asset pricing models are developed in the
situation where purchasing power parity (PPP) is not respected.Investors
of different countries do not agree on expected security returns. How-
ever, in this case, an equilibrium on the international assets market
may exist but not on the international goods market. Our purpose
in this paper is to give conditions under which we have equilibrium,
not only on the international assets markets but also on the interna-
tional good market. More precisely, we focus on the link between no-
arbitrage, equilibrium and PPP. At equilibrium, assets markets must
clear and international goods market balance. In particular, equilib-
rium goods prices respect the PPP.
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1 Introduction
Very often, the international asset pricing models are developed around two
considerations. The first one is to take into account of the differences of
taxes between countries or of the presence of barriers to the international
exchange of assets. The second one is to claim that real returns on assets
differ between the nations. Nations are defined as geographical zones where
agents use the same currency in order to deflate prices. The first type of
considerations is not very easy to improve. So, most of the international
asset pricing models are developed in the second situation where purchasing
power parity (PPP) is not respected. These models are partial equilibrium
asset pricing models and exchange rates are exogenous.
Since the PPP is not respected, investors of different countries do not
agree on expected security returns. However, in this case, an equilibrium
on the international assets market may exist but not on the international
goods market.
Our purpose in this paper is to give conditions under which we have
equilibrium, not only on the international assets markets but also on the
international good market. More precisely, we focus on the link between
no-arbitrage, equilibrium and PPP. For that, as in Hart [8], we consider a
two-period international model. In period 0 agents buy or sell financial as-
sets. In period 1, they buy or sell goods with their initial endowments and
the gains of their financial investments in period 0. In our model, contrar-
ily to Solnik [14], investors are not constrained to exchange goods only on
their domestic markets. In period 0, they optimally choose their portfolios
by using expected utility functions. In the second period, they consume
with their initial endowments and the gains yielded by their investments
in period 0. Security returns and goods are valued in domestic currencies.
At equilibrium, assets markets must clear and international goods market
balance. In particular, equilibrium goods prices respect the PPP.
Using no-arbitrage conditions we obtain equilibrium on the international
asset market. We differ from Solnik [14] who assumes equilibrium already
exists and PPP does not hold. Under a condition on the security returns,
we get as in Ross and Walsh [13] that PPP holds for consumption good
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prices. We also obtain, as in Dumas [6], the result that equilibrium does
not exist on the international good market if PPP is not respected, under
risk neutrality. Actually, our result is stronger. When the agents are risk
neutral, an equilibrium on the international good market exists if, and only
if, PPP holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model
with its assumptions. In particular, we introduce no-arbitrage conditions
and a condition on the security returns. In Section 3, we provide existence of
equilibrium theorems for two models: consumption good model and wealth
model. In Section 4 we study the link between PPP and equilibrium. Com-
ments are given in Section 5. We give an example where the condition on
the security returns does not hold. However, there exists an equilibrium on
the asset market but since PPP is not satisfied, no equilibrium can exists
for the international good market. We also link our results to the general
expression of assets pricing in international assets pricing models (see e.g.
Fontaine [7]). We also show that when the agents are risk neutral, an equi-
librium on the international good market exists if, and only if, PPP holds.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period economy with L+ 1 countries and K assets. We
suppose there exists one consumption good which may be traded between
the L+1 countries. In each country there is only one consumer. In period 0,
agent i, (i = 0, . . . , L) purchases assets and consumes in period 1. There are
S states of nature in period 1. If state s occurs, in period 1, the consumer
in country i will consume cis:
cis = ω
i
s +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θik
where θi is the portfolio she purchased in period 0, ωis is the initial endow-
ment of consumption good, Rik(s) ≥ 0 is the return of asset k in country i.
The initial endowment ωis and the return R
i
k(s) are valued in currency of
country i.
3
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We consider two cases: the two-period consumption model, and the two-
period wealth model.
In the first case: for any i, any s:
cis = ω
i
s +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
i
k ≥ 0
The consumption set Xi is
Xi =
{
θ ∈ RK : for any s, ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk ≥ 0
}
In the second case:
cis = ω
i
s +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
i
k ∈ R
The consumption set Xi is RK
Let (piis ≥ 00) in the S-unit simplex be the belief of agent i. If q is the
asset price, agent i will solve:
(P) max
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
i
k)
θi ∈ Xi,
K∑
k=1
qkθ
i
k ≤ 0.
We suppose that for any i, agent i has no initial endowment for the assets.
(We actually consider the net purchases of the agents).
The return of a security is to be interpreted as the total value of one unit of
security in the second period, including received dividends payments (there-
fore, returns should not be confused with rates of returns). Returns are
unknown in the first period, but investors are assumed to have probabilistic
beliefs about them.
We make the following assumptions:
A1: For any i, any s,
∑K
k=1R
i
k(s) > 0
A2: For any i, any k,
∑S
s=1R
i
k(s) > 0
These assumptions are not very stringent. If A1 is not satisfied for some
4
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i, some s, in this case, country i will not make any exchange on the asset
market in state s. If A2 is not satisfied for some i, some k, country i will
never purchase asset k.
A3: For any i, there exists no non-null (θ1, . . . , θK) which satisfies
∀s,
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk = 0
This assumption means that, for any country i, the K assets are not redun-
dant.
P: For every state s, every country i, piis > 0
We also asume
U1: For any i, the utility function ui is concave, strictly increasing, differ-
entiable in R++ for the consumption model and in R for the wealth model .
For the wealth model, we denote ai = ui′(+∞), bi = ui′(−∞), i = 0, . . . , L.
Definition 1
We say that {θik}i,k is a net trade if for any k,
∑
i θ
i
k = 0
We introduce an assumption called Consistency Condition:
(C) There exist [(τ∗is > 0); i = 0, . . . , L; s = 1, . . . , S], such that
For any net trade {θik}, one has: ∀s,
∑
i
τ∗is c
i
s =
∑
i
τ∗is ω
i
s
We say, in this case, that the sequence of prices (τ∗is )i,s satisfies the Con-
sistency Condition (C). Observe that using the prices (τ∗is ), the international
goods trade balance.
If we normalize by taking τ∗0s = 1, ∀s, then (τ∗is )s=1,...,S is the exchange
rate between country i and 0 in state s.
Definition 2
An equilibrium is a list [(θ∗i, (c∗is ; p∗is )s=1,...,S)i=0,...,L, q∗ 6= 0] such that
(1) ∀i, θ∗i will solve problem (P) given q∗
(2)
∑L
i=0 θ
∗i = 0
(3) ∀i, ∀s, c∗is = ωis +
∑K
k=1R
i
k(s)θ
∗i
k
(4) The sequence of prices ((p∗is )s=1,...,S)i=0,...,L satisfies
∀i,
∑
s
p∗is c
∗i
s =
∑
s
p∗is ω
∗i
s
5
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and the Consistency Condition (C)
Relation (2) is the market clearing on the asset market while condition
(C) implies ∀s, ∑Li=0 p∗is c∗is = ∑Li=0 p∗is ωis.
This condition is the balance on the consumption goods market in currency
of country 0. At an equilibrium, we allow investors to hold portfolios which
yield negative rates of return with positive probability. But in the second
period, the value of the returns obtained from the net purchases of assets
traded in period 0 will be zero.
We first have
Proposition 1 Assume ωis > 0,∀i, ∀s if we consider the consumption
model. Then Condition C is equivalent to
(E) ∀i 6= 0, ∀s, ∀k, τ∗is Rik(s) = R0k(s).
Proof : Let (θik) a net trade defined as follows:
Fix some country i and some asset k. Take θ0k = , θ
i
k = −, θ0k′ = θik′ =
0,∀k′ 6= k, θj = 0,∀j 6= 0, k. For  > 0 small enough, (θi) ∈ Xi, ∀i. Then
∀s,
∑
j
τ∗js c
j
s =
∑
j
τ∗js ω
j
s + (R
0
k(s)− τ∗is Rik(s))
If (C) holds, then R0k(s) = τ∗is Rik(s). The converse is obvious.
We now introduce No arbitrage conditions
Definition 3
w is a useful 1 assets purchase for agent i if for any λ ≥ 0, for any θ ∈ Xi,
one has:
(a) θ + λw ∈ Xi
(b)
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θk + λwk)) ≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk)
Let W i denote the set of useful vectors for agent i.
1For a definition of useful and useless purchases, see e.g. Werner [15]
6
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Proposition 2 For the consumption model, we have
W i =
{
w ∈ RK :
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s
}
Proof : Consider (a) in the previous definition. Divide the LHS by λ and
let it go to infinity. We obtain
∑K
k=1R
i
k(s)wk ≥ 0.
Conversely, assume ∀s,∑Kk=1Rik(s)wk ≥ 0. Then obviously, for any θ ∈ Xi,
any λ ≥ 0, one has (a). From the increasingness of ui, we have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θk + λwk) ≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk)
We obtain (b).
Proposition 3 Consider the wealth model. A vector w is useful for i if and
only if:
∀θ ∈ RK ,
K∑
k′=1
wk′
S∑
s=1
piisu
i′(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk)R
i
k′(s) ≥ 0 (1)
Proof : It is very similar to those given in Dana and Le Van [3], [4] by using
the concavity and the differentiability of the ui.
We can have another characterization of W i for the wealth model. The
proof of the following proposition is adapted from Dana and Le Van [4].
Proposition 4 Consider the wealth model. Let w ∈ Xi and let ζs =∑
k R
i
k(s)wk, ∀s, S+ = {s : ζs ≥ 0}, S− = {s : ζs < 0}.The vector w
is useful is for i if and only if,
ai
∑
s∈S+
piisζs + b
i
∑
s∈S−
piisζs ≥ 0 (2)
7
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Proof : From Proposition 3, w is useful, if and only if, for any θ ∈ RK , we
have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i
(
ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θk + λwk)
)
≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θk), ∀λ ≥ 0.
Take θ = 0. We then have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis + λζs) ≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis), ∀λ ≥ 0.
Thus, ζ is useful for the function (cs)s →
∑
piisu
i(cs). We then have for
any (cs)s
0 ≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(cs)−
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(cs + ζs) ≥ −
S∑
s=1
piisu
i′(cs)ζs.
This implies
∑S
s=1 pi
i
su
i′(cs)ζs ≥ 0. For any s ∈ S+ let cs go to +∞, and for
s ∈ S−, let cs go −∞. We then obtain (2).
The converse is obvious since ui′ is non-increasing.
Remark 1
The set of useful vectors is larger for the wealth model. It includes the set
of useful vectors of the consumption model. But when ai = 0, or bi = +∞,
they coincide.
Corollary 1 Consider the wealth model. If ai = 0 or bi = +∞ then W i ={
w ∈ RK : ∑Kk=1Rik(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s}
Proof : It is obvious.
Definition 4
A vector q is a no-arbitrage price for agent i if q · w > 0, for all w ∈W i.
Let Si denote the cone of no-arbitrage prices for agent i. Then, obviously,
Si = − int(W i)0. Under assumption A3, the sets W i do not contain lines
and the sets Si are non empty (see e.g. Dana, Le Van and Magnien [5]).
In finance, there is another concept of no-arbitrage. We call it NA1. A
vector q is a NA1 price, or more simply NA1, if for any country i, for any
8
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portfolio θ which satisfies Rik(s) · θ ≥ 0, ∀s, and Rik(s′) · θ > 0 for some s′,
then we have q · θ > 0.
Proposition 5 Under (C), a vector q is NA1 if and only if:
∀s, R0k(s) · θ ≥ 0 and R0k(s′) · θ > 0 for some s′, then q · θ > 0.
Proof : Obvious.
Proposition 6 Consider the consumption model. Assume A3. Then q is
NA1 if and only if it is a no-arbitrage price.
Proof : Let q be no-arbitrage. Given i, let w satisfy Rik(s) · w ≥ 0, ∀s and
Rik(s
′) ·w > 0 for some s′. In this case w ∈W i \ {0}. Hence q ·w > 0. That
means q is NA1.
Conversely, let q be NA1. Given i, let w ∈W i\{0}. then we have Rik(s)·w ≥
0, ∀s and Rik(s′) · w > 0 for some s′. If not, Rik(s) · w = 0, ∀s and from
A3, w = 0: a contradiction. Since q is NA1, we have q · w > 0, i.e. q is
no-arbitrage.
Proposition 7 Consider the consumption model. (a) If q∗ is an equilibrium
price then it is NA1.
(b) Assume A3. If q∗ is an equilibrium price then it is both NA1 and no-
arbitrage.
Proof : (a) Given i, let ψ satisfy Rik(s) · ψ ≥ 0, ∀s and Rik(s′) · ψ > 0 for
some s′. Let θ∗i denote the associated equilibrium portfolio. Since ui is
strictly increasing, and piis > 0, ∀s, we have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
∗i
k + ψk)) >
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
That implies q · ψ > 0.
(b) The result follows from (a) and Proposition 6.
9
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Proposition 8 Consider the wealth model. (a) If q is no-arbitrage, then it
is NA1. If q∗ is an equilibrium price, then it is NA1.
(b) Assume A3. If ui is strictly concave then∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)(θk + wk)) >
∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θk)
for any θ, any w ∈W i \ {0}. And any equilibrium price is no-arbitrage.
Proof : (a)Let q be no-arbitrage. Given i, let w satisfy Rik(s) · w ≥ 0, ∀s
and Rik(s
′) · w > 0 for some s′. In this case w ∈ W i \ {0}. Hence q · w > 0.
That means q is NA1.
Given i, let ψ satisfy Rik(s) ·ψ ≥ 0, ∀s and Rik(s′) ·ψ > 0 for some s′. Let θ∗i
denote the associated equilibrium portfolio. Since ui is strictly increasing,
and piis > 0, ∀s, we have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
∗i
k + ψk)) >
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
That implies q · ψ > 0.
(b) Let w ∈W i \ {0}. Then from A3, ∑sRik(s)wk 6= 0. If
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k + wk)) =
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
i
k) (3)
then, by strict concavity of the ui:
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k +
1
2
wk)) >
1
2
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
i
k)
+
1
2
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k + wk))
=
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k + wk)) by (3)
which is a contradiction since
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k + wk)) ≥
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
i
k +
1
2
wk))
10
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Let [(θ∗i), q∗] be an equilibrium. Then for any w ∈W i \ {0} we have
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)(θ
∗i
k + wk)) >
S∑
s=1
piisu
i(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
This implies q∗ · w > 0.
Remark 2 For the wealth model, excepted the cases ai = 0 or bi = +∞,
we do not have the equivalence between NA1 prices and no-arbitrage prices
as in the consumption model.
3 Existence of equilibrium
Proposition 9 Assume A1, A2, P, U1 and the following no-arbitrage
condition
(NA) ∩Li=0 Si 6= ∅
Then there exist [(θ∗i)i=0,...,L; q∗ >> 0] such that
(a) ∀i, θ∗i solves problem (P)
(b)
∑L
i=0 θ
∗i = 0
Proof : The proof may be found in several papers, e.g., Werner [15], Page
and Wooders [9], Dana, Le Van, Magnien [5]. The strict positivity of q∗
comes from the strict increasingness of the ui and assumptions A1, A2.
Proposition 10 Consider the consumption model. Assume A1, A2, A3,
P, U1 and C. Assume that for any i, ωis > 0,∀s. Then there exists an
equilibrium. The equilibrium prices satisfy PPP
∀i, ∀s, p∗is = τ∗is p∗0s
Proof : See Appendix.
11
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Proposition 11 Consider the wealth model. Assume A1, A2, A3, P, U1,
condition (C), and for any i, either ai = 0 or bi = +∞. Then there exists
an equilibrium. The prices (p∗is ) satisfy PPP.
Proof : In this case, from Proposition 4, for any i, W i = {w ∈ RK :∑
sR
i
k(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s}. The proof is therefore the same as for Proposition
10.
More generally,
Proposition 12 Consider the wealth model. Assume A1, A2, A3, P, U1,
condition (C), and for any i, ai < ui′(ωis +
∑K
k=1R
i
k(s)θk) < b
i, ∀θ. Then
there exists an equilibrium if, and only if, there exists a no-arbitrage price,
i.e. there exist [(θi, λi > 0)i=0,...,L] such that
∀i, ∀j, ∀k′, λi
∑
s
piisu
i′(ωis+
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)R
i
k′ = λ
j
∑
s
pijsu
j′(ωjs+
∑
k
Rjk(s)θ
j
k)R
j
k′
The prices (p∗is ) satisfy PPP.
Proof : See Appendix.
4 Equilibrium and PPP
In this section we emphasize the role of condition (C) or equivalently (E)
and the existence of PPP through the following proposition.
Proposition 13 Assume A1, A2, A3, P, U1 and C. Let [θ∗i, q∗] solve P
for any i and
∑
i θ
∗i = 0. Let
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
Then there exists a price system (p˜∗is )i,s such that [(c∗is ), (p˜∗is )] is an equilib-
rium for the model where
(a) each agent i solves:
max
∑
s
piisu
i(cis)
12
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under the constraints:
ci ∈ Xi = {c ∈ RS | ∃θ ∈ RK , cs = ωis +
∑
k
Rikθk} ∩ RS+ for the consumption model
ci ∈ Xi = {c ∈ RS | ∃θ ∈ RK , cs = ωis +
∑
k
Rikθk} for the wealth model
and the budget constraint ∑
s
p˜∗is c
i
s ≤
∑
s
p˜∗is ω
i
s
and
(b) ∀s, ∀i, p˜∗is = τ∗is p˜∗0s
In other words, the prices system (p˜∗is )i,s satisfies the PPP.
Conversely, under A3, if [(c∗is ); (p˜∗is ); i = 0, . . . , L; s = 1, . . . , S] is an
equilibrium for the model given just above with p˜∗is = τ∗is p˜∗0s , ∀i, ∀s then
[θ∗i, q∗] solve P for any i, where
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
and
q∗ =
∑
s
p˜∗0s R
0(s)
and
∑
i θ
∗i = 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
5 Comments
5.1 Comment 1
Condition (E) means that for any portfolio θ1, . . . , θk, the return it yields
will be the same for any country i if it is valued in currency 0. This condition
is very important. We give an example where it is not satisfied and we have
no equilibrium.
13
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We consider a consumption model with two countries, 0 and 1, two states
of nature and two assets. We assume
Ro =
[
1 0
1 2
]
, R1 =
[
0 1
2 1
]
In this economy, condition (E) is not satisfied. We have
W 0 = {(θ1, θ2) : θ1 ≥ 0, θ1 + 2θ2 ≥ 0}
W 1 = {(θ1, θ2) : θ2 ≥ 0, 2θ1 + θ2 ≥ 0}
S0 = {(p1, p2) : p1 > 0, p2 > 0, 2p1 − p2 > 0}
S1 = {(p1, p2) : p1 > 0, p2 > 0, 2p2 − p1 > 0}
One can check that (1, 1) ∈ S0 ∩ S1. From Proposition 9, there exist
[(θ∗i)i=0,1; (q∗(1), q∗(2))] such that
(a) ∀i, θ∗i solves problem (P)
(b)
∑2
i=0 θ
∗i = 0
(c) (q∗(1), q∗(2)) >> 0
If we have an equilibrium then ∀s, ∑i p∗sci∗s = ∑i p∗sωis which implies∑
i
∑
k
Rik(s)p
∗i
s θ
∗i
k = 0, ∀s
In our case, we have in particular
R01(1)p
∗0
1 θ
∗0
1 +R
0
2(1)p
∗0
1 θ
∗0
2 +R
1
1(1)p
∗1
1 θ
∗1
1 +R
1
2(1)p
∗1
1 θ
∗1
2 = 0
Since θ∗01 + θ∗11 = 0, we get[
R01(1)p
∗0
1 −R11(1)p∗11 ]θ∗01 +
[
R02(1)p
∗0
1 −R12(1)p∗11
]
θ∗02 = 0
Replacing R01, R
1
1, R
0
2, R
1
2 by their values, we finally obtain
p∗01 θ
∗0
1 − p∗11 θ∗02 = 0
which is a contradiction since q∗1θ∗01 + q∗2θ∗02 = 0.
14
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5.2 Comment 2
Consider condition (E). We assume that for any country i, the asset i is
riskless. The returns Rii(s) will not depend on s and are assumed to be
constant. Condition (E) may be written as
Logτ∗is = LogR
0
i (s)− LogRii
Let Eii = LogR
i
i. Assume that the returns are given, as in Fontaine [7],
relation (5)
LogR0i (s) = E
0
i (s) +
M∑
m=1
b0imf˜
0
m(s)
where f˜0m are the common factors, we then obtain
Logτ∗is = E
0
i (s)− Eii +
M∑
m=1
b0imf˜
0
m(s) (4)
which is relation (9) in Fontaine [7].
More generally, assume that
LogRjk(s) = E
j
k(s) +
M∑
m=1
bjkmf˜
j
m(s)
Let r0jk(s) = Log(τ
∗j
s R
j
k(s)). r
0
jk is the return of asset k in country j valued
in currency 0. We get:
r0jk(s) = E
j
k(s) +
M∑
m=1
bjkmf˜
j
m(s) + E
0
i (s)− Eii +
M∑
m=1
b0imf˜
0
m(s) (5)
which corresponds to relation (11) in Fontaine [7]. If Relation (5) holds for
any country j, for any asset k, we then have an equilibrium in the two-period
consumption model. However, this condition is not sufficient for the wealth
model. Actually, to get Relation (4), Fontaine [7] considers a wealth model
and supposes there exists no arbitrage opportunity. In this case, we have
also an equilibrium for his two-period wealth model
15
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5.3 Comment 3
An equilibrium price is given by
∀i, ∀k, q∗k = λi
S∑
s=1
piisu
i′(ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )R
i
k(s)
= λi
S∑
s=1
piisu
i′
(
ωis +
K∑
k=1
R0k(s)θ
∗i
k
τ∗is
)
R0k(s)
τ∗is
(6)
Consider the case where all the countries risk-neutral (ui(x) = x). As-
sume A1, A2, A3, P, U1 and (E). From our existence of equilibrium results,
if an equilibrium exists we then have PPP. Let us prove the converse. From
(6), if an equilibrium exists with risk-neutral agents then, up to a scalar,
asset prices are
∀k = 1, . . . ,K, q∗k =
∑
s
piisR
i
k(s)
and consumption prices are therefore (piis). Assume they satisfy PPP:
∀i, ∀s, piis = τ∗is pi0s
Then
∀k = 1, . . . ,K, q∗k =
∑
s
pi0sR
0
k(s)
Let (ψik) be a portfolio net trade, i.e.
∑L
i=0 ψ
i
k = 0. We claim that
[(ψi, (c∗is ;piis)s=1,...,S)i=0,...,L, q∗] is an equilibrium where
∀i, ∀s, c∗is = ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)ψ
i
k
Indeed, consider some country i and let (θik) satisfy∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k) >
∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)ψ
i
k)
16
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Equivalently, since ui(c) = c:∑
k
∑
s
piisR
i
k(s)θ
i
k >
∑
k
∑
s
piisR
i
k(s)ψ
i
k∑
k
∑
s
pi0sτ
∗i
s R
i
k(s)θ
i
k >
∑
k
∑
s
pi0sτ
∗i
s R
i
k(s)ψ
i
k∑
k
∑
s
pi0sR
0
k(s)θ
i
k >
∑
k
∑
s
pi0sR
0
k(s)ψ
i
k
q∗ · θi > q∗ · ψi
Hence [(ψi), q∗] solve (P). It is easy to check that
∀i,
∑
s
piisc
∗i
s =
∑
s
piisω
i
s
∀s,
∑
i
piisc
∗i
s =
∑
i
piisω
i
s
Our claim is true.
6 Conclusion
Our paper attempts to link, when we are in presence of international mar-
kets, the General Equilibrium and the Finance frameworks. It emphasizes
the role of exchange rates and the respect vs the non-respect of the Purchas-
ing Power Parity. If PPP is not respected, we cannot have an equilibrium on
the international goods markets but we may have an equilibrium on the in-
ternational financial assets. In the usual literature, for instance Rogoff [12],
the common feeling is that PPP is not respected, even in the long run and
that testing PPP will introduce a lot of problems. The implication of these
considerations is that we have a discrepancy between these two international
markets. Our paper may therefore open to future empirical research test-
ing the coherency between international financial markets and international
goods markets. It might be interesting to see, during the recent financial
crisis, (i) whether the discrepancies between the two markets were widened
or not, and (ii) if the deviations from PPP were bigger or not, compare to
the situations before the crises.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 10 We know that condition C is equivalent to con-
dition E . Under (E), the set W i
W i =
{
w ∈ RK :
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s
}
=
{
w ∈ RK : 1
τ∗is
K∑
k=1
R0k(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s
}
=
{
w ∈ RK :
K∑
k=1
R0k(s)wk ≥ 0, ∀s
}
is independent of i and hence Si is the same for all i. We will show that
S0 is non-empty. Indeed, let w ∈ W 0 \ {0}. Then there exists s′ such
that
∑
k=1,...,K R
0
k(s
′)wk > 0. If not, we have: ∀s,
∑
k=1,...,K R
0
k(s)wk = 0.
From A3, w = 0 which is a contradiction. Now, let q ∈ RK be defined by
∀k, qk =
∑
s=1,...,S R
0
k(s). Then q ·w > 0 for any w ∈W 0 \{0}. That means
q ∈ S0. The No-Arbitrage condition (NA) is therefore satisfied.
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From Proposition 9, there exist [(θ∗i)i=0,...,L; q∗ 6= 0] such that
(a) ∀i, θ∗i solves problem (P)
(b)
L∑
i=0
θ∗i = 0.
Let
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
and let q∗ be an equilibrium price. We know that q∗ is NA1. From Dana
and Jeanblanc-Pique´ [2], there exists
(
(βis > 0); i = 0, . . . , L; s = 1, . . . , S
)
such that ∀i, q∗ = ∑s βisRi(s). Define p˜∗is = βis, s = 1, . . . , S; i = 0, . . . , L.
We have
∀i, q∗k =
∑
s
p˜∗is R
i
k(s) =
∑
s
p˜∗is
τ∗is
R0k(s) =
∑
s
p˜∗0s R
0
k(s) (7)
Let
Z = {z ∈ RS :
∑
s
zsR
0
k(s) = 0, ∀k}
Z = {0} if the market is complete. From (7), we get
∀i, p˜∗is = τ∗is (p˜∗0s + zis)
with (zi) ∈ Z. Define
∀i 6= 0, ∀s, p∗is = p˜∗is − τ∗is zis = τ∗is p˜∗0s (8)
p∗0s = p˜
∗0
s (9)
Now, let
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
We have ∑
s
p∗is c
∗i
s =
∑
s
p∗is ω
i
s +
∑
k
q∗kθ
∗i
k =
∑
s
p∗is ω
i
s
since
∑
k q
∗
kθ
∗i
k = 0.
Observe that, for any s, any i, we have
p∗is R
i
k(s) = p
∗0
s R
0
k(s)
20
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Hence
p∗is c
∗i
s = p
∗i
s ω
i
s +
∑
k
p∗is R
i
k(s)θ
∗i
k
= p∗is ω
i
s +
∑
k
p∗0s R
0
k(s)θ
∗i
k
Summing over i we get ∑
i
p∗is c
∗i
s =
∑
i
p∗is ω
i
s
i.e. the prices (p∗is ) satisfy the Consistency Condition. Obviously, they also
satisfy PPP. We end the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12 (1) Assume there exist [(θi, λi > 0)i=0,...,L] such
that
∀i, ∀j, ∀k′, λi
∑
s
piisu
i′(ωis+
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)R
i
k′ = λ
j
∑
s
pijsu
j′(ωjs+
∑
k
Rjk(s)θ
j
k)R
j
k′
Let
qk′ = λi
∑
s
piisu
i′(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)R
i
k′ , ∀k′
We will show that q is no-arbitrage. Indeed, let w ∈ W i \ {0}. Let ζs =∑
k R
i
k(s)wk, ∀s. We will show
q · w = λi
∑
s
piisu
i′(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)ζs > 0
From A3, ζ 6= 0. Let S+ = {s : ζs ≥ 0}, S− = {s : ζs < 0}. We have
λi
∑
s
piisu
i′(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)ζs > λ
i
ai ∑
s∈S+
piisζs + b
i
∑
s∈S−
piisζs
 ≥ 0
That means q is no-arbitrage for any agent i. Under A1, A2, P, U1, if there
exists a no-arbitrage price then (see e.g. Werner [15], Page and Wooders [9],
Dana, Le Van, Magnien [5]) there exist [(θ∗i)i=0,...,L; q∗ >> 0] such that
(a) ∀i, θ∗i solves problem (P)
(b)
∑L
i=0 θ
∗i = 0
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The proof of the existence of (p∗is ) which satisfy condition (4) of an equilib-
rium is the same as in the proof of Proposition 10.
Conversely, if [(θ∗i)i=0,...,L; q∗ 6= 0] are the equilibrium port-folio and
equilibrium assets prices, then
∀k′, q∗k′ = λ∗i
S∑
s=1
piisu
i′
(
ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k
)
Rik′(s), λ
∗i > 0
and
∀i, ai < ui′
(
ωis +
K∑
k=1
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k
)
< bi
One can show as just above that q∗ ∈ ∩iSi, i.e. a no-arbitrage price.
Proof of Proposition 13 Let [θ∗i, q∗] solve P for any i and ∑i θ∗i = 0.
In this case, q∗ is NA1. From Dana and Jeanblanc-Pique´ [2], there exists(
(βis > 0); i = 0, . . . , L; s = 1, . . . , S
)
such that ∀i, q∗ = ∑s βisRi(s). Define
p∗is = βis, s = 1, . . . , S; i = 0, . . . , L. We have
∀i, q∗k =
∑
s
p∗is R
i
k(s) =
∑
s
p∗is
τ∗is
R0k(s) =
∑
s
p∗0s R
0
k(s) (10)
Let
Z = {z ∈ RS :
∑
s
zsR
0
k(s) = 0, ∀k}
Z = {0} if the market is complete. From (10), we get
∀i, p∗is = τ∗is (p∗0s + zis)
with (zi) ∈ Z. Define
∀i 6= 0, ∀s, p˜∗is = p∗is − τ∗is zis = τ∗is p∗0s (11)
p˜∗0s = p
∗0
s (12)
Now, let
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
We have ∑
s
p˜∗is c
∗i
s =
∑
s
p˜∗is ω
i
s +
∑
k
q∗kθ
∗i
k =
∑
s
p˜∗is ω
i
s
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since
∑
k q
∗
kθ
∗i
k = 0.
Observe that, for any portfolio of country i, θi,
q∗ · θi =
∑
s
p˜∗is (
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k)
Now, let ∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k) >
∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
This implies q∗ · θi > q∗ · θ∗i or equivalently∑
s
p˜∗is (
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k) >
∑
s
p˜∗is (
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
And if we define
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
cis = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k, ∀i, ∀s
we obtain ∑
s
p˜∗is c
∗i
s >
∑
s
p˜∗is c
i
s
That means [(c∗is ); (p˜∗is ); i = 0, . . . , L; s = 1, . . . , S] is an equilibrium for the
model where
(a) each agent i solves:
max
∑
s
piisu
i(cis)
under the constraints:
ci ∈ Xi = {c ∈ RS | ∃θ ∈ RK , cs = ωis +
∑
k
Rikθk} ∩ RS+ for the consumption model
ci ∈ Xi = {c ∈ RS | ∃θ ∈ RK , cs = ωis +
∑
k
Rikθk} for the wealth model
and the budget constraint∑
s
p∗is c
i
s ≤
∑
s
p∗is ω
i
s
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and
(b) ∀s, ∀i, p˜∗is = τ∗is p˜∗0s
Relation (b) implies the balance on the consumption good market valued in
currency 0, i.e.
∑
i p˜
∗i
s c
∗i
s =
∑
i p˜
∗i
s ω
i
s, ∀s.
Conversely, under A3, one can check that if [(c∗is ); (p˜∗is ); i = 0, . . . , L; s =
1, . . . , S] is an equilibrium for the model given just above with p˜∗is = τ∗is p˜∗0s , ∀i, ∀s
then [θ∗i, q∗] solve where P for any i and ∑i θ∗i = 0, where
c∗is = ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k , ∀i, ∀s
and
q∗ =
∑
s
p˜∗0s R
0(s).
Indeed, let∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k) >
∑
s
piisu
i(ωis +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
That implies∑
s
p˜∗is (ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
i
k) >
∑
s
p˜∗is (ω
i
s +
∑
k
Rik(s)θ
∗i
k )
or equivalently ∑
k
(
∑
s
p˜∗is R
i
k(s))θ
i
k >
∑
k
(
∑
s
p˜∗is R
i
k(s))θ
∗i
k
Under (E), we get
q∗ · θi > q∗ · θ∗i
It remains to show that the asset market clears. Since
p˜∗is = τ
∗i
s p˜
∗0
s , ∀i, ∀s
and ∑
s
p∗is c
i
s =
∑
s
p∗is ω
i
s, ∀i
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we have ∑
i
∑
k
τ∗is R
i
k(s)θ
∗i
k = 0
or equivalently ∑
k
R0k(s)(
∑
i
θ∗ik ) = 0
Assumption A3 implies
∑
i θ
∗i
k = 0, ∀k. The proof is complete.
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